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PERSONALIZING INFORMED CONSENT:  
THE CHALLENGE OF HEALTH LITERACY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The legal doctrine of informed consent does not adequately consider an 
individual patient’s literacy—in particular health literacy.1  Considering the 
level of a patient’s health literacy is an essential part of the ongoing 
communication required for obtaining genuinely informed consent.  It also 
influences whether the patient was subjectively informed and understood the 
terms of the consent.  If informed consent is to properly represent a patient’s 
knowledge and understanding of risks, then health literacy must be 
considered. 
The traditional roles of the patient and physician are changing as 
emerging health policies and processes place a greater burden on patients 
to acquire and process health information and data.2  In particular, patient 
literacy is increasingly important with the advent of consumer-directed 
healthcare (CDHC) and personal health records (PHR).3  Supporters of 
CDHC believe that under this model of care there will be shared decision 
making between physicians and patients.4  If this is the case, patients clearly 
 
 1. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text (discussing definitions for health 
literacy). 
 2. See Jamie Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The 
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 431 (2006). 
 3. Consumer-directed health plans couple catastrophic health insurance coverage with 
large deductibles.  CDHC aims at patients taking more responsibility for their own health and 
health care, by additional cost sharing, researching, and selecting providers, relying on health 
information from alternative sources (websites) and maintaining of personal health records.  
See id. at 487 (noting that patients increasingly have more of a role in treatment and medical 
decisions).  See generally TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE 
CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 17-26, 119-49 (2007) (discussing how CDHC can mold 
patients into better health care consumers and increase overall value of health care through 
the increase of patient cost sharing obligations; also discussing how cost sharing can force 
patients to be more selective in choosing a provider); Jane Root & Sue Stableford, Easy-to-
Read Consumer Communications: A Missing Link in Medicaid Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 1, 2 (1999) (discussing how patients must now take more responsibility for 
their health and health care); Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs 
and Risks to Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 4. See Linda M. Axtell-Thompson, Consumer Directed Health Care: Ethical Limits to 
Choice and Responsibility, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 207, 224 (2005); compare King & Moulton, 
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need to be health literate to effectively share in the decision making process.  
Critics of CDHC suggest that this model puts patients at more risk financially 
and in regards to treatment decisions.5  Thus, patients’ health literacy is 
important if they are to understand the risks of treatment options.  
Whichever way consumer directed healthcare is viewed, literacy becomes 
more of a factor than it was under the traditional model of healthcare 
delivery.  Patients are involved more in healthcare processes that require 
literacy, yet patient literacy should not be assumed.6 
This Comment identifies inadequate patient health literacy as a barrier 
to obtaining genuine informed consent that is not adequately taken into 
account by the legal system.  Genuine informed consent requires patient 
understanding of disclosures of risks.7  Proper legal consideration of patient 
health literacy can be accomplished through a re-evaluation of the legal 
standards of disclosure, and/or statutory changes to the requirements of 
informed consent forms, and/or the requirements of disclosure 
communication.  The legal doctrine of informed consent is rich in rhetoric of 
individual autonomy, yet only on rare occasions have the courts addressed 
patient literacy when examining the validity of informed consent.8  This 
Comment argues that the ethical justifications for informed consent can be 
used to strengthen the argument for modifying the legal standards for 
informed consent so that patient health literacy is adequately taken into 
account. 
The standard for determining the adequacy of a patient’s informed 
consent depends on the legal jurisdiction.  In some jurisdictions adequacy is 
determined by the reasonable physician standard, also called the 
professional custom standard.9  This is the legal (not ethical) customs of the 
profession.  The reasonable physician standard is influenced by 
accreditation standards (the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and the American Board of Medical 
Specialties (ABMS)), regulations (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS)), and the American Medical Association (AMA).  In other jurisdictions, 
adequacy is determined by what a “reasonable” patient expects and/or 
needs to know.10  In the ethical domain, genuine informed consent is often 
viewed as the result of a continuing discussion between physician and 
 
supra note 2, at 487 (arguing that shared decision making is necessary due to the increased 
role of consumerism in health care). 
 5. See Axtell-Thompson, supra note 4, at 225 (discussing that if the CDHC is badly 
executed, the results could be severe, including “cost shifting rather than cost efficiency”). 
 6. See infra Part II (discussing patient literacy). 
 7. See infra Part III.A. 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. 
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patient, and is justified by the patient’s right of autonomy and self-
determination.11  Adequate consideration of patient health literacy is 
arguably required under the ethical theories of informed consent, including 
those based on individual autonomy, the waiver of epistemic and ethical 
norms, and shared decision making.12  The reasonable patient standard 
currently provides the best opportunity to advocate for consideration of 
health literacy in informed consent litigation.  The best option for improving 
the quality of informed consent of patients with varying levels of health 
literacy may be to pass state legislation that addresses the process of 
consent and the readability level of consent forms. 
Part II of this Comment begins with an examination of the current 
literature on general literacy and health literacy of Americans and concludes 
that inadequate health literacy is a pervasive problem in the United States, 
health literacy is difficult to accurately measure, and patient illiteracy leads 
to poor health outcomes.  Part III describes the basics of the legal doctrine 
of informed consent, emphasizing the competing standards for the scope of 
disclosure—the reasonable physician standard and the reasonable patient 
standard.  The discussion of the legal doctrine is followed by a brief 
discussion of the ethical perspectives of informed consent, and whether 
health literacy is consistent with ethical requirements for obtaining genuine 
informed consent.  Part IV explores how literacy affects consent and focuses 
largely on the readability of informed consent forms.  Part V discusses health 
literacy and the legal informed consent doctrine by analyzing current case 
law, identifying potential barriers to an increased recognition of the 
importance of health literacy in achieving legally valid informed consent, 
identifying potential avenues to increase the consideration of health literacy, 
and reviewing initiatives that have been implemented to address health 
literacy in the context of informed consent.  This Comment concludes by 
summarizing the key findings and making recommendations for advocacy 
approaches to improve the quality of informed consent through recognition 
of the inadequate health literacy levels of patients. 
II.  GENERAL LITERACY AND HEALTH LITERACY 
In the United States, approximately twenty-one percent of the adult 
population has low literacy skills, defined as “reading at the sixth grade level 
or below,” and “twenty-seven percent may have limited literacy ability, 
defined as lacking general reading and numeracy proficiency to function 
adequately in society.”13  Therefore, nearly half of the adult population has 
 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
 12. See infra notes 88-91, 94-99, 102-03 and accompanying text. 
 13. David I. Shalowitz & Michael S. Wolf, Shared Decision-Making and the Lower Literate 
Patient, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 759, 759 (2004). 
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deficiencies in reading and/or computational skills.14  Low literacy is 
associated with poor patient “understanding of written or spoken medical 
advice, adverse health outcomes, and negative effects on the health of the 
population.”15  Low literacy among patients has been described as a “silent 
epidemic” because physicians and other healthcare providers are often 
unaware of their patients’ low literacy.16  The average adult in the United 
States reads at an Eighth or Ninth grade level, and the average Medicaid 
patient reads at a Fifth grade level.17  Health literacy may be significantly 
worse than general literacy since literacy is context specific and medical 
information can be full of unfamiliar vocabulary (medical jargon) and 
concepts.18  Health literacy skills include all the traditional literacy skills 
(reading and writing), plus several additional or enhanced skill sets, such as, 
knowledge of common health-related vocabulary, abbreviations, and how 
the healthcare system works.19  Thus, patients who have low general literacy 
also have low health literacy, but patients with low health literacy include 
some patients who do not have low general literacy.  It has been estimated 
that approximately ninety million Americans have low health literacy.20 
The 2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy (NAAL) was the first 
large-scale assessment to measure health literacy in the United States.21  
The NAAL functional definition of health literacy is “[t]he ability to 
comprehend and use printed and written health information to function in 
society, to achieve one’s goals, and to develop one’s knowledge and 
 
 14. Ad Hoc Comm. on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Affairs, Am. Med. 
Ass’n, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, 281 JAMA 552, 552 (1999) 
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Comm., Health Literacy]. 
 15. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, LITERACY AND HEALTH OUTCOMES: 
SUMMARY 1, 1 (2004), available at www.ahrq.gov/clinic/epcsums/litsum.pdf (last visited Apr. 
16, 2009) [hereinafter AHRQ REPORT]. 
 16. Erin N. Marcus, The Silent Epidemic — The Health Effects of Illiteracy, 355 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 339, 340 (2006); see Jennifer Fisher Wilson, The Crucial Link Between Literacy and 
Health, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 875, 875-76 (2003) (examining the incredibly low levels 
of health literacy in the United States). 
 17. JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., PATIENTS AS PARTNERS: HOW 
TO INVOLVE PATIENTS AND FAMILIES IN THEIR OWN CARE 72 (Meghan McGreevey ed., 2006) 
[hereinafter PATIENTS AS PARTNERS]; see also Root & Stableford, supra note 3, at 5 (reporting 
“that nearly half of all adults read at the eighth grade level or below[,]” and that “[s]eventy-five 
percent of welfare recipients read at this same low level.”). 
 18. Ad Hoc Comm., Health Literacy, supra note 14. 
 19. SHEIDA WHITE, ASSESSING THE NATION’S HEALTH LITERACY: KEY CONCEPTS AND FINDINGS 
OF THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY (NAAL) 22 (2008), available at www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/367/hl_report_2008.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2009). 
 20. Jillanne M. Schulte, Health Literacy: Closing the Communication Gap Between 
Doctors and Patients, HUM. RTS., Fall 2007 at 18, 18. 
 21. WHITE, supra note 19, at 3. 
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potential.”22  The report states that “health literacy measures the 
comprehension and use of printed health-related prose and documents and 
performance on arithmetic operations using health-related information 
embedded in a text.”23  The assessment reported results in four performance 
levels: Below Basic, Basic, Intermediate, and Proficient.24  On the 2003 
NAAL, twenty-two percent of adults scored at the Basic level in health 
literacy and fourteen percent were at the Below Basic level.25 
According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
health literacy is “a constellation of skills that constitute the ability to perform 
basic reading and numerical tasks for functioning in the health care 
environment and acting on health care information.”26  Healthy People 
2010, a policy report of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, defined health literacy as “[t]he degree to which individuals have 
the capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic health information 
and services needed to make appropriate health decisions.”27  Health 
literacy, according to the Institute of Medicine (IOM), “is a shared function 
of cultural, social, and individual factors.”28  For the purposes of this 
Comment, health literacy is defined as the possession of reading, writing, 
and communication skills that enable patients to obtain, process, and 
understand health information and services needed to make informed health 
decisions. 
While there is no universally accepted definition of health literacy or way 
to measure health literacy, several organizations have developed models for 
evaluating health literacy.  The NAAL, discussed supra, tested health literacy 
by measuring comprehension of “printed or written health-related materials 
and performance on arithmetic operations using health-related information 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 22. 
 24. Id. at 3, 33 tbl.4 (“Below Basic indicates a grasp of no more than the simplest, most 
concrete literacy skills,” for example, “[s]igning a form.”  “Basic indicates skills needed to 
perform simple everyday literacy activities,” including “[e]ntering names and birth dates in a 
health insurance application.”  “Intermediate indicates skills necessary to perform moderately 
challenging literacy activities,” such as, “[c]onsulting reference materials to determine which 
foods contain a particular vitamin.”  “Proficient indicates skills necessary to perform more 
complex and challenging literacy activities,” for example “[i]nterpreting a table about blood 
pressure, age, and physical activity.”). 
 25. Id. at 43. 
 26. AHRQ REPORT, supra note 15, at 1. 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Understanding and Improving Health, in 1 
HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010, at 11-20 (2000), available at www.healthypeople.gov/Document/pdf/ 
Volume1/11HealthCom.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010]. 
 28. COMM. ON HEALTH LITERACY, INST. OF MED., HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END 
CONFUSION 32 (Lynn Nielsen-Bohlman et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter IOM]. 
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imbedded in text.”29  The NAAL identified three types of health literacy tasks: 
clinical, preventive, and navigation.30  The NAAL did not measure 
“knowledge of health issues” or “understanding of medical jargons”, 
“scientific terms and symbols”, and “[s]kills associated with listening, 
speaking, and nonverbal communication.”31  The variables that were not 
measured would be useful in evaluating how health literacy impacts 
informed consent, because standard informed consent forms are often full 
of medical jargons, and scientific terms and symbols.  Also, informed 
consent is theoretically an ongoing communication process in which 
listening and speaking skills are crucial.  If a signed consent form is used 
merely as evidence that a conversation between the patient and physician 
took place, then listening, speaking, and nonverbal communication skills 
are essential parts of the informed consent process.  Thus, while the NAAL is 
useful for obtaining a general understanding of health literacy, it lacks 
important measures of health literacy that relate to a patient’s ability to give 
informed consent. 
Since the NAAL first introduced the health literacy questions as an aspect 
of its assessment in 2003, there have been numerous attempts by others to 
measure health literacy.  Two popular measures of health literacy among 
researchers are the Test of Functional Health Literacy in Adults (TOFHLA) 
and the Rapid Estimate of Adult Literacy in Medicine (REALM).32 
The reading comprehension portion of the TOFHLA involves common 
materials used in healthcare settings, including standard informed consent 
forms.33  A patient is deemed to have inadequate or low literacy if they 
answer fewer than half of the TOFHLA questions correctly.34  This means 
they may have difficulty reading “pill bottle labels, appointment slips, 
 
 29. WHITE, supra note 19, at 7 (emphasis removed). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Wilson, supra note 16, at 875.  But see RIMA RUDD ET AL., LITERACY AND HEALTH IN 
AMERICA 3-20 (2004), available at www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/PICHEATH.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2009) (discussing another method of measuring health literacy—the “Health 
Activities Literacy Scale” (HALS)).  Introduced in 2004, the HALS emphasizes the importance of 
the interaction between the complexity of health material and what individuals are expected to 
do with the material, instead of focusing only on the structure and complexity of written or 
printed texts.  Id. at 3, 17.  Approximately 12% of the U.S. adult population is estimated to 
have Level 1 skills on the HALS and “an additional 7% can be expected to have great difficulty 
performing even these simple tasks with a high [level] of proficiency” (level 2: 27%; level 3: 
36%; level 4: 17%; level 5: 1%).  Id. at 3, 20 fig.3.  The HALS identified the following skills as 
essential for adults to have health literacy: document reading skills, specific types of writing 
skills for completing forms, math skills, presentation skills, a descriptive vocabulary, and 
listening and speaking skills.  Id. at 42. 
 33. Wilson, supra note 16, at 875. 
 34. Id. 
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educational brochures, informed[]consent forms,” and other health 
information.35  “TOFHLA takes up to 22 minutes to administer.”36  Based on 
the results of TOFHLA patients are placed in one of three categories: 
inadequate health literacy, marginal health literacy, or adequate health 
literacy.37  Even patients classified as having adequate health literacy may 
have difficulty understanding complex informed consent forms.38 
The REALM test measures a patient’s health literacy based on their 
ability to read and pronounce medical words from three lists of twenty-two 
words each.39  The number of words that the patient reads and pronounces 
correctly from each list determines their health literacy.40  The words range 
in difficulty from “fat” and “eye” to “osteoporosis” and “impetigo.”41  The 
REALM test can be performed quickly, in approximately three minutes,42 
which makes it practical, but the test does not require that patients define 
the medical words.  Being able to read aloud a consent form is of little use if 
a patient does not understand the words that they are reading. 
Currently, there is no measure that accounts for all of the skills and 
knowledge associated with health literacy.43  A model for evaluating health 
literacy in patients would be most useful in the informed consent context if it 
measures comprehension of excerpts from informed consent forms, 
knowledge of health issues, understanding of medical and legal 
terminology,44 scientific terms, and skills associated with listening, speaking, 
and nonverbal communication.  While there is no universally accepted 
measure of health literacy, it is clear that health literacy is a factor for many 
patients. 
It is difficult for physicians and other healthcare providers to identify 
patients with poor literacy skills.45  One reason for this difficulty is that 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. IOM, supra note 28, at 48. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 47-48, 302 tbl.C-1. 
 40. Id. at 48. 
 41. IOM, supra note 28, at 302 tbl.C-1. 
 42. Id. at 47. 
 43. Id. at 50; see also Mark Hochhauser, Liabilities of “Unreadable” Consent Forms, in 
2005 SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS BOOK 115, 117 (Edward F. Gabriele & Valerie J. Ducker eds., 
2005), available at www-s.med.uiuc.edu/administration/research/resources/SRA/proceedings 
.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (stating there are no readability formulas developed 
specifically for informed consent forms; “[t]hus, there is no data on the validity and reliability 
of readability formulas for informed consent forms in [the] adult population.”). 
 44. This Comment is focused on health literacy, but complex informed consent forms may 
also contain legal jargon/terminology, which could make it more difficult to understand the 
form. 
 45. Marcus, supra note 16, at 340. 
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patients are often ashamed and skilled at hiding their low literacy.46  It has 
been suggested that as a universal precaution healthcare providers should 
assume that all patients have low health literacy, whether or not they have 
low general literacy skills.47  This precaution would be helpful to achieve 
genuine informed consent from patients.  If time is taken to explain the risks 
that are being consented to verbally and/or informed consent forms are 
written in plain language, then it is more likely that patients with low health 
literacy will understand the risks and be able to give genuinely valid 
informed consent. 
The majority of adults in the United States with low literacy skills are 
white and natural born citizens.48  Low literacy is most prevalent among the 
elderly,49 persons with low cognitive ability, the less educated, lower 
socioeconomic groups, the incarcerated, and persons of certain racial or 
ethnic groups (minorities).50  A study conducted from 1993-1994 at two 
urban public hospitals found that many patients could not comprehend 
basic medical directions that contained numerical information.51  Research 
has demonstrated that there is a relationship between low health literacy 
and poor health status—low health literacy “may lead to poor [healthcare] 
quality and excess medical services and costs.”52  A relationship has been 
found between lower literacy skills and “a limited understanding of personal 
health issues, infrequent use of preventive care services, delayed diagnosis, 
poor adherence to treatment and medical instructions, inadequate disease 
self-management skills, and higher health care costs.”53  Literacy skills have 
been found to be a better predictor of health status than “age, income, 
employment status, education level, and racial or ethnic group.”54 
Inadequate health literacy is a pervasive problem in the United States.  It 
affects a wide variety of people and has been associated with poor health 
outcomes.  Health literacy is difficult to measure, and it is something that 
patients are unlikely to volunteer to their physicians.  Health literacy affects 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 341. 
 48. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 71. 
 49. Mark V. Williams et al., Inadequate Functional Health Literacy Among Patients at Two 
Public Hospitals, 274 JAMA 1677, 1681 (1995); see also Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Health 
Literacy Among Medicare Enrollees in a Managed Care Organization, 281 JAMA 545, 548 
(1999) (finding in a study of Medicare enrollees that “more than one third of respondents had 
inadequate or marginal health literacy.”). 
 50. AHRQ REPORT, supra note 15 at 1; Wilson, supra note 16, at 876. 
 51. Williams et al., supra note 49, at 1678-79. 
 52. Shoou-Yih D. Lee et al., Health Literacy, Social Support, and Health: A Research 
Agenda, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1309, 1316 (2004). 
 53. Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 759 (internal citations omitted). 
 54. Wilson, supra note 16, at 875. 
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consent because it dictates how much of an informed consent conversation 
and/or consent form is comprehended. 
III.  INFORMED CONSENT: THE LEGAL DOCTRINE AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The legal doctrine of informed consent has borrowed justifications from 
ethics, such as autonomy and self-determination.  There are two different 
senses of informed consent: the autonomous authorization by individuals 
and the social rules of consent, which includes legally valid consent.55  This 
Section covers the basics of the legal doctrine of informed consent that 
developed out of a judicial deference for autonomy.56  Noticeably absent 
from the discussion of legal informed consent in the medical context is any 
mention of health literacy.  In the realm of ethics, autonomy, the waiver of 
epistemic and ethical norms, and shared decision making have all been 
proposed as the principles that support informed consent.  Obtaining 
genuinely informed consent from patients with low health literacy can be 
accomplished by harmonizing legal informed consent doctrine with ethical 
principles. 
A. Legal Doctrine 
Under the common law doctrine of informed consent, physicians have a 
duty to inform patients of material risks of a treatment or procedure and 
alternative treatment options.57 
Informed consent has developed out of strong judicial deference toward 
individual autonomy, reflecting a belief that an individual has a right to be 
free from nonconsensual interference with his or her person, and a basic 
moral principle that it is wrong to force another to act against his or her 
will.58 
Courts do not usually consider whether the patient comprehended or was 
able to comprehend the risk discussion or form as long as the patient is 
generally competent.59  Legally recognized exceptions to informed consent 
are cases of emergency, incompetency, waiver, and therapeutic privilege 
 
 55. Nicolas P. Terry, What’s Wrong with Health Privacy?, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES IN 
BIOETHICS 68, 73-74 (Ana S. Iltis et al. eds., 2008) (citing TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. 
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 143-44 (4th ed. 1994)). 
 56. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 230 (6th ed. 
2008). 
 57. Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 372-73 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
 58. FURROW ET AL., supra note 56, at 230. 
 59. Id. at 244.  Further, as of 2007, there were no “formal practice guidelines from 
professional societies for the assessment of a patient’s capacity to consent to treatment.”  Paul 
S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1834, 1838 (2007). 
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(the first three being non-controversial).60  While there is variability across 
legal jurisdictions, in general, the legal standards for decision making 
capacity “embody the abilities to communicate a choice, to understand the 
relevant information, to appreciate the medical consequences of the 
situation, and to reason about treatment choices.”61  From a clinical 
perspective, “[v]alid informed consent is premised on the disclosure of 
appropriate information to a competent patient who is permitted to make a 
voluntary choice.”62  The duty of disclosure varies by jurisdiction—in some it 
is “the medical standard of disclosure”, and in others it is the “degree of 
disclosure sufficient to permit the ordinary patient to make a sound 
decision.”63 
The medical custom/reasonable physician (professional) standard of 
informed consent looks at “what information a reasonable, prudent 
physician would have disclosed to the patient under similar 
circumstances.”64  The court in Natanson v. Kline articulated the reasonable 
physician standard, but they also noted that the physician has an obligation 
to “disclose and explain to the patient in language as simple as 
necessary.”65  The physician has discretion as to what is necessary so long 
as it is “consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to assure an 
informed consent by the patient.”66  Twenty-three states use the reasonable 
physician (professional) standard for disclosure in informed consent cases.67 
The reasonable patient standard for the scope of disclosure looks at 
what information would be material for a reasonable patient in similar 
circumstances, and was articulated in Canterbury v. Spence.68  Under this 
standard, valid consent results from “the informed exercise of a choice, and 
that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available 
 
 60. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 124 (6th 
ed. 2009). 
 61. Appelbaum, supra note 59, at 1835. 
 62. Id. at 1834. 
 63. Carl E. Schneider, Void for Vagueness, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 10, 
10. 
 64. Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health Care: 
Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 91, 96 (2007); Natanson v. Kline, 
350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960). 
 65. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 1107. 
 67. David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two 
Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 105, 106-09 
fig.1, tbl.1 (2007) (stating that there are twenty-three states, however figure 1 and table 1 
indicate twenty-two states in 2002). 
 68. Kapp, supra note 64, at 96-97; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972). 
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and the risks attendant upon each.”69  Informed consent results from a 
patient’s understanding of risks and alternative treatment options.70  The 
physician has a duty of reasonable disclosure of material alternatives and 
risks.71  The court rejected the majority view that the physician’s duty to 
disclose is dependent upon the custom of physicians practicing in the 
community.72  Instead, the prevailing medical practice has evidentiary value 
but does not define the standard.73  The court set an objective standard for 
material risks, holding that “‘[a] risk is . . . material when a reasonable 
person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s 
position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in 
deciding whether or not to undergo the proposed therapy.’”74  In Cobbs v. 
Grant, the Supreme Court of California justified the reasonable patient 
standard in informed consent cases with the following postulates: 
The first is that patients are generally persons unlearned in the medical 
sciences and therefore, except in rare cases, courts may safely assume the 
knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity.  The second is that a 
person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of 
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful 
medical treatment.  The third is that the patient’s consent to treatment, to be 
effective, must be an informed consent.  And the fourth is that the patient, 
being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon and 
trust in his physician for the information upon which he relies during the 
 
 69. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780. 
 70. Id. at 780 n.15. 
 71. Id. at 782, 786-87. 
 72. Id. at 783. 
 73. Id. at 785. 
 74. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, 
Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)).  The reasonable or 
prudent patient standard has been criticized as rejecting “the centrality of the individual 
patient, in all his or her particularity, and implicitly accepts the view that in any medical 
choice-making situation, there can be only one ‘correct’ decision—not a range of possible 
decisions, each potentially appropriate depending on the tastes, values, and trade offs among 
conflicting values of the individual patient.”  Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s 
Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 760 (1986).  One court 
rejected the “objective standard for determining the causation issue” in informed consent 
claims and adopted a subjective standard, “on [the] grounds that ‘no consideration is given to 
the peculiar quirks and idiosyncrasies of the individual,’ and that patient’s ‘supposedly 
inviolable right to decide for himself what is to be done with his body is made subject to a 
standard set by others.”  Id. at 761 n.30 (quoting McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 897 
(N.C. 1982)).  However, the case has no “precedential impact” because subsequent to the 
court’s decision, state legislation was passed “limiting the scope of informed consent . . . .”  
Id. (citing Dixon v. Peters, 306 S.E.2d 477, 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)). 
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decisional process, thus raising an obligation in the physician that 
transcends arms-length transactions.75 
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted the reasonable 
patient standard either by statute or case law.76 
While the reasonable patient standard considers the perspective of the 
patient, and is thus in some respects preferable over the professional 
standard, the reasonable patient standard still fails to require or encourage 
a physician to accommodate the health literacy of a particular patient when 
obtaining informed consent.  There may be room to argue that a prudent 
physician would not depend on the consent form to achieve informed 
consent without adequate discussion with the patient and accommodations 
for the patient’s health literacy. 
The legal doctrine of informed consent has been criticized as being 
more committed to the rhetorical ideal of patient self-determination than “in 
its provision of effective legal redress to victimized patients.”77  Realist critics 
of informed consent argue that, in practice, informed consent “equals little 
more than a legally worthless piece of paper with signatures obtained and 
filed away in the medical record.”78  Alan Weisbard argued in 1986 that 
[w]hile purporting to assure respect for individual self-determination, the 
inaptly named law of informed consent has done little to ‘inform’ the unique 
and sometimes idiosyncratic needs, concerns, and fears of individual 
patients on whose ‘consent’ so much is said to rest.  Indeed, one can 
plausibly maintain that the legal doctrine has done more to teach physicians 
how to practice medicine ‘defensively’ (so as to minimize legal liability) than 
it has to foster physician-patient relationships that permit and encourage 
patients to participate actively and knowledgeably in decisions concerning 
their care.79 
This criticism begs the question: where did this rhetoric of self-determination 
originate? 
B. Ethical Perspectives of Informed Consent 
Both the legal and ethical notions of informed consent feature language 
of self-determination and autonomy, but despite having similar justifications 
for informed consent they approach the means to obtaining informed 
consent differently.  There are many different ethical theories that can be 
 
 75. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972). 
 76. Studdert et al., supra note 67, at 105-06 & fig.1, 107-09 tbl.1 (stating that there are 
twenty-five states, however figure 1 and table 1 indicate twenty-six states in 2002.  Colorado 
and Georgia are classified as having hybrid standards). 
 77. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 751. 
 78. Kapp, supra note 64, at 99 (internal citations omitted). 
 79. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 751. 
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applied to the issue of informed consent, but autonomy-based theories 
appear to be popular among those interested in the medical context.80  
Generally it is accepted in both ethics and the law that the boundaries of the 
duty to reveal are defined by the patient’s right to self-decision, or self-
determination.81 
Beauchamp and Childress’ ethical view of informed consent is often 
cited.82  They discuss informed consent from the perspective of respect for 
autonomy,83 and argue that “from the moral viewpoint, informed consent 
has less to do with the liability of professionals as agents of disclosure and 
more to do with the autonomous choices of patients and subjects.”84  
Beauchamp and Childress break down informed consent into the following 
elements: (1) “[c]ompetence (to understand and decide)[,]” (2) 
“[v]oluntariness (in deciding)[,]” (3) “[d]isclosure (of material information)[,]” 
(4) “[r]ecommendation (of a plan)[,]” (5) “[u]nderstanding” (of disclosure 
and recommendation), (6) “[d]ecision (in favor of a plan)[,]” and (7) 
“[a]uthorization (of the chosen plan)[.]”85  While courts narrowly focus on 
disclosure and jurisdictions are split between the reasonable physician and 
reasonable patient standards for disclosure, for Beauchamp and Childress 
disclosure is merely one component of informed consent.86  The element of 
understanding significantly identifies understanding of disclosure as 
necessary for informed consent.87  A person understands “if they have 
acquired pertinent information and have relevant beliefs about the nature 
and consequences of their actions.”88  It is not necessary for understanding 
to be complete; it suffices to have an understanding of the fundamental 
facts.89  The element of understanding emphasizes that while disclosure is 
an element of informed consent, disclosure to the patient without patient 
understanding is not sufficient.90  If a patient cannot understand the 
pertinent information of the disclosure due to low health literacy, then the 
 
 80. Most articles that are not written by ethicists seem to adopt autonomy as the default 
ethical justification for informed consent.  See, e.g., Jennifer Matiasek & Matthew K. Wynia, 
Reconceptualizing the Informed Consent Process at Eight Innovative Hospitals, 34 JOINT 
COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 127, 127 (2008) (noting that informed consent 
derives from autonomy). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 55, at 87-91. 
 83. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 117-120. 
 84. Id. at 121. 
 85. Id. at 120-21. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 120. 
 88. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 127. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See generally id. at 120-24 (noting that physicians may be guilty of negligent 
disclosure, even if their action conforms to professional practice). 
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element of understanding is not fulfilled, and informed consent is not 
achieved.  Thus, from the perspective of respect for patient autonomy, when 
inadequate health literacy prevents patients from understanding disclosure 
communications, informed consent has not been realized.91 
Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill have criticized the popular autonomy-
based justification of informed consent.92  Instead of an autonomy-based 
justification, they propose an approach to informed consent that views 
informed consent as a waiver of epistemic and ethical norms, including 
accuracy and honesty.93  They argue that “[e]pistemically adequate 
communication is relevant communication, and has to be limited to what is 
appropriate to the actual context.”94  The justification for informed consent 
is that “it offers a standard and controllable way of setting aside obligations 
and prohibitions for limited and specific purposes.”95  Informed consent 
allows for the granting of permission for action that would “otherwise 
constitute a breach of bodily integrity, personal liberty or privacy.”96  
Standardized informed consent forms emphasize formalities and uniformity 
while failing to provide adequate evidence that the underlying obligations 
have been waived or that the transactions were epistemically sound.97  
“Signatures, let alone ticks in boxes, may have legal weight, but they lack 
ethical weight, and often do not provide evidentiary weight that genuinely 
informed consent has been given.”98  Under this theory, genuine informed 
consent is obtained when the relevant communication takes place and a 
patient understands which obligations he or she is consenting to waive, 
regardless of whether or not a standard informed consent form is signed.99 
Communication is central to informed consent under the shared 
decision making theory.100  Some commentators believe that informed 
consent should be synonymous with shared decision making between 
physician and patient; however, there is no agreement on how informed 
 
 91. See id. at 140 (discussing that patient demands are still unsettled). 
 92. NEIL C. MANSON & ONORA O’NEILL, RETHINKING INFORMED CONSENT IN BIOETHICS 94 
(2007). 
 93. Id. at 94-95, 185. 
 94. Id. at 63. 
 95. Id. at 188. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added). 
 97. MANSON & O’NEILL, supra note 92, at 190-91. 
 98. Id. at 192. 
 99. See id. at 63, 95, 185, 188, 191-92 (noting that good communication between 
patient and physician is imperative to informed consent). 
 100. See generally Simon N. Whitney et al., A Typology of Shared Decision Making, 
Informed Consent, and Simple Consent, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 54, 54-56 (2004) (noting 
that shared decision making involves the exchange of ideas and information between patient 
and physician); Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 759-60 (explaining that shared decision 
making is improved by promoting joint communication between patient and physician). 
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consent and shared decision making are related.101  Shared decision 
making is closely aligned with the ethical autonomy based justification of 
informed consent.  There are three stages in the shared decision making 
process: (1) “information exchange,” (2) “deliberation,” and (3) 
“decision.”102  Under this theory, informed consent does not occur when a 
consent form is signed, but rather when the patient and physician “discuss a 
problem and choose an intervention together, a process that may take place 
in [one] sitting or over the course of several encounters.”103  Within this 
process low health literacy is an obstacle to the exchange of information 
and, as a result, deliberation and decision making.  Shared decision making 
would require doctors to discuss information in a manner that permits 
patients with low health literacy to understand the material information.  
Shared decision making focuses on interpersonal communication in the 
informed consent process as opposed to the mechanical signing of a 
consent form. 
Beauchamp and Childress, Manson and O’Neill, and shared decision 
making represent three different ethical approaches to informed consent.  
Health literacy is important for understanding disclosure under autonomy-
based informed consent, for understanding what underlying obligations are 
being waived by consent within Manson and O’Neill’s framework, and for 
information exchange and deliberation in the shared decision making 
process.  Consideration of health literacy is justified from multiple ethical 
perspectives. 
Health literacy is not currently an explicit factor that courts consider 
when determining whether a patient gave informed consent to a medical 
procedure or treatment.104  Courts narrowly focus on the physician duty of 
disclosure while neglecting to investigate whether the patient understood the 
disclosure given their health literacy level.105  Ethical theories consist of more 
elements than mere disclosure for informed consent.  Courts initially relied 
on ethical justifications of autonomy for the doctrine of informed consent, 
but they should now look to ethics for support for considering health literacy 
in informed consent cases.  The incorporation of health literacy into the 
legal doctrine of informed consent can be accomplished through advocacy 
 
 101. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 117-20. 
 102. Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 760. 
 103. Whitney et al., supra note 100, at 54 (internal citations omitted). 
 104. As of March 25, 2009, a document search for cases containing both “health literacy” 
and “informed consent” produces no cases on both WestLaw and LexisNexis. 
 105. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 119-20, 121-22 (noting the legal 
doctrine of informed consent is primarily based on a physician’s obligation to use reasonable 
care to provide accurate information to the patient). 
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around understanding of disclosure and disclosure of communications with 
the help of ethical principles. 
IV.  HOW LITERACY AFFECTS CONSENT 
Informed consent is contingent upon the general and health literacy of 
the patient, i.e. the patient’s “ability to understand pertinent information.”106  
In healthcare, under normal circumstances,107 patients are required to sign 
informed consent forms prior to surgery, receiving blood products, or 
participating in human subjects research.108  A quick examination of patients 
with limited English proficiency demonstrates that healthcare organizations 
recognize the importance of understanding the language of consent 
communication.  The case law surrounding this class of patients also 
illustrates potential barriers to greater accommodations for health literacy, 
including the readability of informed consent forms. 
A. Limited English Proficiency Patients 
There are approximately eleven to twenty-one million Americans who 
are not proficient in English.109  In other words, they have limited English 
proficiency.110  A physician may be liable for failing to obtain a patient’s 
consent to proceed with treatment if a limited English proficiency (LEP) 
patient is not provided with interpreter services.111  Healthcare organizations 
receiving federal funds (i.e., payments from Medicare and Medicaid) must 
comply with civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination against anyone 
 
 106. Frank McClellan, Medical Malpractice Law, Morality and the Culture Wars: A Critical 
Assessment of the Tort Reform Movement, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 33, 42 (2006). 
 107. As opposed to an emergency in which there is no time to get consent from the patient 
or a family member.  Or when a patient is not legally competent in which case a family 
member is often asked to sign the consent form. 
 108. Michael K. Paasche-Orlow, The Challenges of Informed Consent for Low-Literate 
Populations, in UNDERSTANDING HEALTH LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICINE AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH 119, 125 (Joanne G. Schwartzberg et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Paasche-Orlow, The 
Challenges of Informed Consent]. 
 109. Siddharth Khanijou, Comment, Rebalancing Healthcare Inequities: Language Service 
Reimbursement May Ensure Meaningful Access to Care for LEP Patients, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 855, 856 (2005); see also Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 127-28 (noting there 
are twenty-two million Americans with limited English proficiency). 
 110. See Khanijou, supra note 109, at 870 (discussing that a language barrier exists 
between patients and physicians that results in communication difficulties); see also Matiasek 
& Wynia, supra note 80, at 127-28 (discussing that English proficiency poses a barrier to 
efficient healthcare communication). 
 111. Khanijou, supra note 109, at 870. 
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seeking healthcare services.112  CMS recommends that medical institutions 
provide patients with informed consent forms written in simple sentences in 
the primary language of the patient.113  However, consent forms are 
typically written in English,114 although some hospitals have begun using 
translated consent forms.115  Although this is helpful for LEP patients who are 
literate in their written native language, translated consent forms pose the 
same barriers—they are difficult to read and understand—to low-literate LEP 
patients as English forms do for patients with low health literacy.  The CMS 
recommendation that consent forms be written in simple sentences in the 
primary language of the patient should be applied to forms in English as 
well. 
Even when the physician agrees that lack of understanding of the English 
language would prevent a signed consent form from being valid, it may be 
difficult to win an informed consent case, as evidenced by Rodriguez v. New 
York City Health and Hospitals Corp.116  In this 2008 case a patient alleged 
that, although she signed a consent form, the consent was invalid due to her 
inability to read English.117  New York State, where the case was brought, 
uses the professional standard for disclosure in informed consent cases.118  
The court seemed to doubt the patient’s sincerity that she could not 
understand the form because she did not ask to have a Spanish consent 
form or interpreter provided.119  The patient had also acted as a translator 
for another Spanish-speaking patient during her hospital stay.120  The 
opinion does not discuss the extent to which she translated and the nature of 
what she translated.121  She may have simply translated the symptoms that 
the patient was experiencing.  If that was the case, a person with low health 
literacy would likely be able to orally explain symptoms in any language, but 
 
 112. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 74; see Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 
132 (“Not providing adequate language assistance can . . . breach Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 . . . .”). 
 113. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 75. 
 114. Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 129. 
 115. Id. at 132. 
 116. Rodriguez v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 50 A.D.3d 464, 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008). 
 117. Id. at 465. 
 118. See id. (noting, as part of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove “the defendant 
physician failed to disclose the material risks, benefits, and alternatives to the contemplated 
medical procedure which a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances 
would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable 
evaluation”). 
 119. Id. at 466. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See generally Rodriguez, 50 A.D.3d at 464-66 (no mention about the extent to which 
plaintiff translated). 
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may still have difficulty comprehending a standard consent form, risks, and 
alternatives that use medical terminology.  In this case the court was 
reluctant to take the patient’s word for it that she did not understand the 
form.122  The judicial reluctance to consider a patient’s comprehension of a 
form written in her non-native language suggests that the courts will be 
resistant to considering whether a native English speaker’s inadequate 
health literacy prevented them from comprehending a consent form. 
B. Readability Level of Informed Consent Forms 
The readability of informed consent forms is important because in most 
states a signed consent form leads to a legal presumption that informed 
consent was obtained.123  Pre-printed informed consent forms are 
“commercially prepared and distributed.”124  These standard informed 
consent forms lack a tailoring to the informational needs of a particular 
patient based on that patient’s educational level and health literacy level.125  
“There is growing reason for concern that consent forms are becoming 
substitutes for, rather than documentary evidence of,” a conversation 
between physician and patient that facilitates informed consent.126  If 
informed consent forms are being used in the place of a conversation 
between physicians and patients, it is crucial that patients are able to 
understand the contents of the forms in order for them to make autonomous 
or shared decisions, and arguably for the physician to satisfy his duty to 
disclose.127 
 
 122. See id. at 466 (noting that there was insufficient evidence that plaintiff did not 
comprehend what the defendant surgeon said or did). 
 123. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40(A)(1) (2008) (a patient signature marking 
or affirmative action through electronic means of a consent form “shall be presumed to be 
valid and effective, in the absence of proof that execution of the consent was induced by 
misrepresentation of material facts.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(b)(2) (2006) (rebuttable 
presumption of valid consent); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(4)(a) (West 2009) (signed written 
consent raises a rebuttable presumption of valid informed consent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2317.54 (West 2004) (“written consent . . . [is] presumed to be valid and effective, in the 
absence of proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . .  that the person executing the 
consent was not able to communicate effectively in spoken and written English or any other 
language in which the consent is written.”). 
 124. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 756. 
 125. Id.  At most hospitals, after a patient has spoken with a physician and agreed on a 
course of action, the patient is provided with an informed consent form to sign.  “[B]ecause 
the forms are presented only after a conversation during which actual understanding and 
consent are presumably ensured, the consent forms themselves are sometimes presented to be 
signed quickly, along with a number of other forms.  As a result, patients rarely read, let alone 
understand, the consent forms they sign.”  Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 129. 
 126. Weisbard, supra note 74, at 756-57. 
 127. See supra Part III. 
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The average adult in the United States reads at an Eighth grade level, 
but consent forms are often written at college or graduate school reading 
levels.128  Informed consent forms utilize structured and technical language 
that can result in confusion, poor understanding, and misinformed 
consent.129  Fear of malpractice vulnerability has contributed to the 
complexity of informed consent documents, for example, “the typical 
informed consent document used for oncology randomized controlled trials 
is five to eight pages long and is written at the grade 13 to 14 level.”130 
After agreeing to or receiving care, at least sixty percent of patients “do 
not read or understand the information contained in informed consent 
forms.”131  It is doubtful that those patients are truly informed about the 
decisions made.132  A study conducted by Mark Williams and his colleagues 
found that 59.5% of patients at two urban public hospitals could not 
understand a standard consent document.133  “Patients unable to 
understand informed consent forms cannot intelligently participate in their 
 
 128. See Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 129 (stating that because consent forms are 
intended to legally protect providers, “these forms often contain complex medicolegal terms 
and are written at the college or even postgraduate [reading] level[s].”); PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, 
supra note 17, at 78 (stating that the informed consent forms at several hospitals in the Iowa 
Health System “were written at the 17th grade level or higher.”); Ad Hoc Comm., Health 
Literacy, supra note 14, at 554 (noting that most consent forms are written “far above [an] 
8th-grade reading level . . . .”). 
 129. IOM, supra note 28, at 187; see also Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al., Readability 
Standards for Informed-Consent Forms as Compared with Actual Readability, 348 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 721, 723 tbl.1 (2003) (The following are examples of informed consent language 
describing “New Information about Risks” at different reading levels: 
 
Fourth Grade “We may learn about new things that might make you want to stop 
being in the study.  If this happens, you will be informed.  You can 
then decide if you want to continue to be in the study.” 
Sixth Grade “We may learn new things during the study that you may need to 
know.  We can also learn about things that might make you want to 
stop participating in the study.  If so, you will be notified about any 
new information.” 
Eighth Grade “We will tell you about new information that may affect your 
willingness to stay in this study.” 
Tenth Grade “We will tell you about new information that may affect your health, 
welfare, or willingness to stay in this study.” 
 
 130. Williams et al., supra note 49, at 1681. 
 131. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 73; Ad Hoc Comm., Health Literacy, supra 
note 14, at 553. 
 132. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 73; see Wilson, supra note 16, at 875 
(explaining that literacy affects a patient’s ability to follow instructions given by his or her 
physician). 
 133. Williams et al., supra note 49, at 1677-82. 
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own care.”134  Given that approximately ninety million Americans have low 
health literacy, it is likely that poor health literacy is contributing to patient 
lack of understanding of information contained in informed consent 
forms.135 
Michael Paasche-Orlow and his colleagues reason that since nearly fifty 
percent of adults read at or below an Eighth grade level, plain language 
should be used for informed consent forms.136  They recommend that 
informed consent forms be written at a Fourth grade to Sixth grade reading 
level in order to convey risks simply and directly to low-literate patients.137  
The National Quality Forum recommends that informed consent forms be 
written at a Fifth grade reading level or lower and that they incorporate 
pictures or symbols to enhance understanding.138  It has been suggested 
that a patient’s low health literacy could invalidate a written informed 
consent.139 
Courts have been reluctant to look beyond the signature on an informed 
consent form to determine if the patient understood the document.140  In 
most states a signed consent form creates a legal presumption that the 
patient’s informed consent was obtained, regardless of the readability level 
of the form and the patient’s own health literacy level.141 
V.  INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE AND HEALTH LITERACY 
Informed consent does not work as intended because “[d]octors 
generally tell patients too little and patients generally understand too little for 
patients to make the choices that lawmakers had imagined.”142  Also, 
patients and providers have different views of when consent is necessary and 
whether true informed consent was obtained.143  If informed consent is to 
represent the autonomous decision of an individual patient, then 
consideration of health literacy needs to be recognized within the legal 
doctrine of informed consent.  This Section explores the limited case law that 
involves patient literacy and identifies ways in which those cases open the 
way for arguments concerning health literacy.  Potential barriers to 
 
 134. Id. at 1681. 
 135. Schulte, supra note 20, at 18. 
 136. Paasche-Orlow et al., supra note 129, at 725. 
 137. Id. 
 138. PATIENTS AS PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 76. 
 139. McClellan, supra note 106, at 47. 
 140. See Rodriguez v. N.Y. City Health and Hosps. Corp., A.D.3d 464, 466 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008) (noting that “there was insufficient evidence that plaintiff did not understand the 
discussions with defendant’s surgeon or other hospital staff.”). 
 141. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 142. Schneider, supra note 63, at 10. 
 143. IOM, supra note 28, at 189. 
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advancing the importance of health literacy in the legal arena are discussed, 
and opportunities for legal recognition of the importance of health literacy 
are then proposed.  This Section concludes with a review of initiatives to 
improve the informed consent process for patients with limited health literacy 
outside of the legal domain. 
A. Case Law Involving Signed Consent Forms and Patient Understanding 
Currently, tort law does not specifically address the problem of patients 
with limited general literacy and/or limited health literacy.144  Only a 
handful of cases discuss both a patient’s literacy level and informed consent 
forms as evidence of informed consent.  The courts in Keomaka v. 
Zakaib,145 Ditto v. McCurdy,146 and Hidding v. Williams147 considered 
signed consent forms, literacy, and informed consent.  An analysis of case 
law illustrates some of the barriers and opportunities for advocating for 
consideration of health literacy within the legal framework of informed 
consent. 
In Keomaka v. Zakaib, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii held 
that a physician does not fulfill his affirmative duty of disclosure “by merely 
having the patient sign a printed informed consent form.”148  The court 
identified the problem regarding consent forms, noting that 
[t]here is a growing reason for concern that consent forms are becoming 
substitutes for, rather than documentary evidence of, an ongoing process of 
disclosure, discussion, and decisionmaking between physician and patient.  
If physicians come to believe (often incorrectly) that their obligation to obtain 
the patient’s informed consent can be satisfied by securing a signature—
even that of a drowsy, drugged, or confused patient on an abstruse, jargon-
ridden, and largely unintelligible preprinted consent form—the law’s 
reliance on written documentation may come to pervert its central purpose 
in requiring informed consent.149 
The patient in Keomaka had not read the consent form before signing it.150  
However, the court reasoned that even if he had read the form, it did not 
disclose the possible risks or alternative forms of treatment.151  The court 
concluded that the patient had “neither the knowledge nor the duty” to ask 
questions in order to receive the information that the doctor was required by 
 
 144. Id. at 184. 
 145. Keomaka v. Zakaib, 811 P.2d 478 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991). 
 146. Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 961 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded, 947 P.2d 952 (Haw. 1997). 
 147. Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 148. Keomaka, 811 P.2d at 486. 
 149. Id. at 486-87 (quoting Weisbard, supra note 74, at 756-57). 
 150. Id. at 487. 
 151. Id. 
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law to disclose.152  Thus, the burden is on the physician to make sure that 
the patient has the requisite understanding to give informed consent. 
The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii held six years later in Ditto 
v. McCurdy that a patient’s signature on a standard informed consent form 
does not fulfill a physician’s affirmative duty of disclosure.153  In Ditto, the 
patient had a fourth grade education, was a first generation Korean 
immigrant, and could not read English when she signed the form.154  The 
patient was fluent in spoken English, but not written English.155  The consent 
form stated that the “‘physician has informed [the patient] of the . . . risks or 
complications involved in [the] treatment or procedures . . . and alternative 
forms of treatment, including nontreatment, available.’”156  Yet the patient 
testified that the physician did not explain alternative procedures or possible 
complications.157  It was clear at trial that the physician believed that 
because the patient spoke English she would be able to read and 
comprehend the consent form.158  At no point was the patient asked by the 
physician or medical staff “whether she could actually read or understand 
the consent form.”159 
The court explained that the doctrine of informed consent is based upon 
principles of individual autonomy, and that informed consent imposes an 
affirmative duty on physicians and surgeons to “fully disclose to a patient 
‘the type of risks and alternatives’ to a proposed treatment or surgery.”160  In 
Hawaii, the doctrine of contributory negligence was replaced with a 
modified comparative negligence statute.161  Therefore, the court reasoned 
that a patient “‘is not contributorily negligent for failing to read a consent 
form[.]’”.162  The court emphasized that it was a pre-printed informed 
consent form.163  The Ditto court endorsed the reasoning of the Keomaka 
court and added “‘[or uneducated]’” to the list of patient characteristics that 
includes “‘drowsy, drugged, . . . confused,’” that would cause concern for 
reliance solely on a signed consent form.164  The court thus signaled that 
education affects a person’s ability to understand a consent form.  A 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Ditto, 947 P.2d at 988. 
 154. Id. at 968, 987. 
 155. Id. at 969-70. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 987. 
 158. Ditto, 947 P.2d at 970, 987 n.27. 
 159. Id. at 970 (emphasis added). 
 160. Id. at 987 (quoting Keomaka v. Zakaib, 811 P.2d 478, 482 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991)). 
 161. Id. at 987 n.26. 
 162. Id. at 987. 
 163. Ditto, 947 P.2d at 987. 
 164. Id. at 988 (quoting Keomaka, 811 P.2d at 487). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] PERSONALIZING INFORMED CONSENT 401 
signature of a competent and literate adult is evidence to be considered 
when determining whether a physician has satisfied his or her affirmative 
duty, but “a signature, standing alone, cannot be equated with any alleged 
comparative negligence on the part of the patient.”165  Thus, the patient has 
no duty to speak up if he or she does not understand a pre-printed consent 
form’s contents.166  It is the physician who has the burden to satisfy the duty 
of disclosure.167 
Though the Ditto court did not specifically address health literacy, it did 
address illiteracy.  It is unclear how the court’s ruling would be applied to a 
case in which the informed consent form was not pre-printed.  The court 
may have purposefully added “uneducated” to the reasoning used in 
Keomaka to question the usefulness of having a signed consent form as 
proof of informed consent. 
Health literacy is related to education and should be added to the list of 
reasons that securing a signature on a consent form is not conclusive 
evidence that genuine informed consent has been given.  The Ditto court 
emphasized in its reasoning that the form was “‘abstruse, jargon-ridden, 
and largely unintelligible,’”168 suggesting that it was full of technical and 
complex language, and likely written at a high reading level.  In 
comparison, a pre-printed form that uses plain English and is written at a 
Fourth to Eighth grade reading level with a patient signature might be 
weighted as strong evidence of true informed consent by a court in this 
jurisdiction for patients who have low general and/or health literacy.  This 
reasoning should be adopted by courts in other jurisdictions because it 
weighs patient education—and by association literacy—as a factor and 
encourages physicians to ensure that patients understand the risks and can 
therefore make true informed consent. 
In Hidding v. Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found 
that “[i]n order for a reasonable patient to have awareness of a risk he 
should be told in lay language the nature and severity of the risk and the 
likelihood of its occurrence.”169  The patient in Hidding had a Sixth grade 
education and “minimal” reading skills.170  The patient’s wife would 
accompany him to his appointments so that she could help him understand 
the doctor’s orders and instructions.171  A consent form was signed by the 
 
 165. Id. at 988. 
 166. See id. (explaining that when patients do not completely understand the consent form, 
the physician has a duty to help them understand). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Ditto, 947 P.2d at 988 (quoting Keomaka, 811 P.2d at 487). 
 169. Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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patient, but according to his wife, he would not have been able to 
understand the document on his own.172  The generic consent form 
identified one risk of treatment as “‘loss of function of body organs’”, but 
the wife interpreted the phrase to mean “‘you can’t get up and walk around 
or that when you do, you may stumble or fall or be very weak or wobbly on 
your feet.’”173 
According to the Hidding court, the doctrine of informed consent is 
based on the principle that every competent adult has the right to determine 
what is done to his or her own body.174  “A doctor is required to provide his 
patient with sufficient information to permit the patient himself to make an 
informed and intelligent decision on whether to submit to a proposed course 
of treatment.”175  The court adopted the Second Restatement of Torts, which 
states that in order to “establish consent to a risk it must be shown both that 
the patient was aware of the risk and that he agreed to encounter it.”176  A 
Louisiana state statute requires that patients be “afforded the opportunity to 
ask questions and must acknowledge in writing his consent to the 
treatment.”177  According to the statute, a patient is presumed to have 
understood and consented when the form is signed.178 
The Hidding court stated that a bland statement as to a risk, such as 
“‘loss of function of body organs,’” when not accompanied by an estimate 
of its frequency, is inadequate.179  The court found that Mrs. Hidding 
“successfully rebutted the presumption attached to the signed consent 
form.”180  The physician has a duty “to disclose material risks in such terms 
as a reasonable doctor would believe a reasonable patient would 
understand.”181  The Hidding court’s ruling suggests that a consent form is 
evidence of informed consent, but is not conclusive.182 
These cases are significant because they addressed the legal 
presumption of valid informed consent when an informed consent form was 
signed by a patient with limited literacy skills.  If courts are willing to 
recognize the importance of education and the duty of the physician to 
ensure patients understand material information, then courts may be 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1194. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1196 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979)). 
 177. Id. at 1195. 
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 179. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196. 
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persuaded that limited health literacy and the readability level of consent 
forms are valid reasons to overcome the presumption that a signed form 
means valid informed consent was obtained. 
B. Potential Barriers and Obstacles 
It has been over a decade since Keomaka,183 Ditto,184 and Hidding185 
were decided and health literacy has yet to be discussed in the context of the 
validity of signed consent forms.  In many states if a patient signs an 
informed consent form they are presumed to have understood and 
consented to the risks.186  It will be difficult to overcome that presumption.  
As of the writing of this Comment, there are no published cases that address 
low health literacy as a possible factor that can overcome the presumption 
of understanding when an informed consent form is signed. 
The reasonable physician standard for disclosure provides little 
opportunity to argue that consent was not sufficiently informed based on an 
individual patient’s health literacy because it is based on the objective 
reasonable physician.  The Hidding court stated that disclosure must be in 
“such terms as a reasonable doctor would believe a reasonable patient 
would understand.”187  With that rule, advocacy is necessary around the 
definitions of “reasonable doctor” and “reasonable patient.”  As discussed 
supra, nearly half of adults in the United States have limited literacy skills, 
and it is likely that many more have low health literacy.188  Does a 
“reasonable doctor” consider that their patients may have limited reading 
skills?  It might be fair to presume that a “reasonable patient” cannot 
understand medical jargon and the complex wording of standard informed 
consent forms.  Under the reasonable physician/professional standard of 
disclosure, the best argument for consideration of health literacy may be 
that it is unreasonable for physicians to rely on pre-printed consent forms 
written at reading levels well above the average American’s reading ability 
to obtain patients’ informed consent. 
A barrier to taking literacy into account is that physicians have difficulty 
recognizing when patients have low health literacy, because patients with 
low literacy are adept at hiding it from their physicians.189  Further, the 
 
 183. Keomaka v. Zakaib, 811 P.2d 478 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991). 
 184. Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 961 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997). 
 185. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1192. 
 186. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  However, “[u]nder the common law, 
consent did not need to be written, and written consent did not provide airtight insulation 
against liability.”  Weisbard, supra note 74, at 757 n.17. 
 187. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196. 
 188. See discussion of literacy supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 760 (noting physicians sometimes are unable 
to judge how much lower literate patients understand); Marcus, supra note 16, at 339 
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majority of functionally illiterate adults “are able to sign their own names 
without difficulty.”190  The 2003 NAAL classified signing a form as one of 
the simplest, concrete literacy skills that a patient with Below Basic health 
literacy skills can do.191  A physician (and a court) may see the patient’s 
signature and mistakenly assume that the patient was able to read and 
comprehend the text of the consent form.192  Thus, physicians are likely to 
overestimate a patient’s understanding of written materials.193  Currently, it 
appears that many doctors assume that a patient understands an informed 
consent form, taking away that assumption will mean that healthcare 
providers will need to spend more time with patients.  The time necessary for 
a physician to ensure a patient understands the risks and is consenting 
would vary upon the patient’s health literacy and the communication skills 
and tools of the physician.  One solution is to allow physicians to bill for the 
consent process.194  If this type of financial incentive were used, the consent 
process should be clearly defined in order to incorporate appropriate 
consideration of patient health literacy. 
Many hospital lawyers, risk managers, and consultants are skeptical that 
simplified consent forms (which are easier to read for patients with low 
health literacy) will suffice to meet regulatory, accreditation, and state 
requirements for valid consent because they lack the legal jargon and 
medical terminology typical of standard informed consent forms.195  This 
skepticism stands in the way of a shift towards informed consent forms 
written in plain English.  It does appear that JCAHO and CMS would find 
simplified consent forms satisfactory based on their current guidelines, but 
simplified forms may not satisfy individual state informed consent laws.196  
State informed consent statutes that do not clearly permit simplified or plain 
English consent forms are a barrier to accommodation for health literacy in 
the informed consent process because of the fear that using them will open 
the doors to more, not less, liability.197 
 
(discussing how one patient’s reading problem was unknown to nurses, social workers, and 
physicians). 
 190. Paashe-Orlow, The Challenges of Informed Consent, supra note 108, at 126. 
 191. WHITE, supra note 19, at 33 tbl.4. 
 192. See generally Paashe-Orlow, The Challenges of Informed Consent, supra note 108, 
at 125-26 (explaining some may mistakenly apply attributes from other signed documents to 
informed consent forms). 
 193. Shalowitz & Wolf, supra note 13, at 760. 
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also Akira Akabayashi & Michael D. Fetters, Paying for Informed Consent, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 
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 195. Matiasek & Wynia, supra note 80, at 135. 
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C. Opportunities for Consideration of Health Literacy 
While patients with low health literacy are capable of consenting, they 
need to understand the informed consent information in order to provide 
genuine informed consent.  In the words of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
“[the] information must give the patient ‘a true understanding.’”198 
The elements of disclosure and understanding of disclosure and 
recommendation are both recognized by Beauchamp and Childress as 
ethically necessary for informed consent.199  If a physician does not have a 
verbal discussion with his or her patient regarding the risks and alternatives 
of treatment, but instead relies on a complex consent form filled with 
medical jargon (a college reading level), then it can be argued that under 
the reasonable patient standard of disclosure, the physician has failed.  If a 
patient cannot understand the consent form—whether because of the 
language in which it is written, the reading level of the form, or the medical 
jargon used—then he or she cannot truly exercise his or her right to self-
determination.  This does not mean that all forms need to be written at a 
lower grade level.  Physicians can use the teach-back/relate-back method 
and/or explain the form in plain English to the patient to enhance 
understanding and overcome the shortcomings of the form.200  This 
argument is supported by the the Supreme Court of Kansas, which held in 
Natanson v. Kline that a physician has an obligation “to disclose and 
explain to the patient in language as simple as necessary.”201 
It is important to remember that informed consent is supposed to be 
supported by physician-patient communication and discussion, not by the 
consent form itself.  The absence of written consent does not necessarily 
mean that there was no consent.  In Yahn v. Folse, the patient was 
functionally illiterate and hard of hearing, and prior to surgery no written 
consent was obtained.202  Dr. Folse believed that he had received oral 
consent when the patient said “‘[o]kay.’”203  On rehearing, the court found 
that Dr. Folse had obtained informed consent.204  Dr. Folse sat close to the 
patient and used a loud voice because he was informed that the patient was 
hard of hearing.205  Further, the physician spent fifteen to twenty minutes 
with the patient prior to the procedure, which the court found was enough 
 
 198. Isaac v. Jameson Mem’l Hosp., 932 A.2d 924, 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 199. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 60, at 117-18. 
 200. See discussion of the teach-back and relate-back methods infra notes 224-31 and 
accompanying text. 
 201. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 (Kan. 1960). 
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time and opportunity for questions.  This case illustrates that informed 
consent does not legally require a signed consent form—absent a state 
statute requiring one—and that a physician can accommodate patients who 
are illiterate and hard of hearing.  By having the material risks explained 
verbally, the patient did not have to try to read a consent form.  This case 
could be used to placate physician fears that simplified consent forms will 
not hold up in court because, absent a state statute, written consent is not 
required.  If a simplified consent form is used as a tool to help the consent 
communication process.  As suggested in Yahn v. Folse, it is that 
communication that validates the informed consent, not the form itself. 
In response to the concern that consent forms written at lower reading 
levels will not be legally sufficient, state legislation can explicitly make those 
consent forms valid.  Ideally, state legislation would endorse plain English 
consent forms and explicitly state that a signed consent form is insufficient if 
a discussion between the physician and patient about the relevant risks and 
alternatives did not take place. 
Quintanilla v. Dunkelman, emphasizes how the existence of informed 
consent is fact- sensitive.206  In Quintanilla the physician argued that a 
signed consent form is conclusive evidence of informed consent, and that to 
hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to deny having read and understood 
consent forms in order to sue physicians.207  The physician contended that 
this would lead to more lawsuits and have a negative impact on the practice 
of medicine.208  The court disagreed and stated that the existence of 
informed consent is “‘a peculiarly fact-bound assessment which juries are 
especially well-suited to make.’”209  Each patient presents a separate unique 
problem; the patient’s mental and emotional conditions, as well as other 
individual circumstances, are important to whether informed consent was 
obtained.210  Thus, the court held that “the validity of written consent” is “a 
question of fact for the jury to decide based upon conflicting evidence.”211  
Whether a person has sufficient health literacy to comprehend a written 
consent form should also be a question of fact for the jury to decide. 
In states that have a reasonable patient standard for disclosure, health 
literacy can be incorporated by advocating that the reasonable person is an 
individual with a similar health literacy level as the patient at issue.  
Advocacy should focus on making this standard more subjective.  Another 
argument is that the reasonable patient should be defined based upon 
 
 206. Quintanilla v. Dunkelman, 133 Cal. App. 4th 95, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
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statistical data of health literacy in the United States or the particular patient 
population. 
One way of alleviating the difficulty of obtaining genuine informed 
consent from patients with low health literacy would be to legislatively 
mandate that all medical informed consent forms be written in plain English, 
without medical jargon.  “Federal securities laws require that certain 
documents geared toward investors conform to the ‘plain English’ rule, 
requiring that documents be written on a sixth or seventh grade reading 
level, in the active voice, and with no double negatives.”212  Jillanne Schulte 
suggests that it would be reasonable for the law to mandate a plain English 
rule for informed consent forms because “[t]he financial information 
contained in Securities and Exchange Commission documents is as 
complex, dense, and sophisticated as any information found in the medical 
field.”213 
D. Current Initiatives to Improve the Consent Process 
As discussed supra, evidence suggests that many standard informed 
consent forms are written at a readability level well above the Eighth grade 
reading level of the average adult in the United States.214  While within the 
legal arena there has been little recognition of the problems posed to the 
informed consent doctrine by inadequate health literacy among patients, the 
following are methods that have been undertaken to improve the 
communications with patients prior to their giving informed consent outside 
of the legal domain: simplified forms with plain language and simple 
illustrations, drawing analogies,215 audiotapes, videotapes, and multimedia 
resources.216  This Section describes some of the initiatives that have tried to 
improve either the readability of consent forms or the disclosure 
communication process. 
JCAHO “requires medical instructions to be given on a level 
understandable to patients.”217  According to JCAHO, an organization must 
obtain and document informed consent in accordance with the 
organization’s policy.218  Further, an organization’s policy must include a 
discussion of risks, benefits, side effects, alternatives, and likelihood of 
achieving goals.219  Some states have statutes that describe alternative 
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means of disclosure that may be used in the informed consent process.220  
CMS guidelines on informed consent forms state that they must include a 
statement that the treatment, benefits, risks, and alternative therapies were 
explained.221  The JCAHO and CMS guidelines were “intended to address 
common concerns about the legality of simplifying consent forms[,]” but it is 
important to note that both guidelines “defer to state law” when state 
statutes require more detailed consent forms.222  Non-uniform state law 
requirements may make a simplified consent form legally valid in one state 
and insufficient in another.223 
Some innovative hospitals have initiatives “to create a more unified 
informed consent process, in which consent forms are used to structure a 
conversation, teach, and ensure patient understanding, as well as for 
documentation and legal protection.”224  One such practice involves 
incorporating systematic redundancies into the informed consent process, or 
the repeat-back method.225  This method is used to make sure that informed 
consent is more than just the signing of a form—it simultaneously allows 
patients the opportunity to ask questions and helps physicians and nurses 
confirm patient understanding.226  Another method is to incorporate repeat- 
back into the consent form, by requiring physicians and/or nurses to check a 
 
 220. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(c) (2006) (stating the information that must be 
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box confirming that a patient was able to correctly repeat back the purpose 
of the procedure, the main risk, and the potential benefit.227  Studies have 
shown that the repeat back method does improve patient comprehension 
and recollection of healthcare information.228  The AHRQ, the Leapfrog 
Group, and the National Quality Forum have all recommended the repeat 
back method for informed consent.229 
Similarly, a strategy that focuses on physician-patient communication 
and patient understanding is the teach-back method, which is used prior to 
obtaining a patient’s signature for consent.  With the teach-back method, 
the physician explains the risks to the patient and then asks the patient to 
repeat the information in their own words so that the physician can gauge 
whether they understood what was conveyed.230  Computer-based programs 
that teach patients about conditions and treatment options, test patient 
understanding, and document informed consent are also being used by 
some hospitals and health systems.231 
Videotapes can also be used as a tool to communicate the information 
needed for informed consent to patients.  In Winkle v. Tullos, the patient was 
shown a videotape that explained the procedure and discussed the risks 
prior to surgery, and she signed a disclosure and consent form that satisfied 
the state statute requirements.232  The court found that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury’s failure to find lack of informed consent.233  
Thus, as long as a consent form complies with state legislation, a videotape 
appears to be a valid substitution for a physician-patient discussion of the 
risks.234  Videotapes could be an efficient way to improve informed consent 
for patients with limited health literacy—assuming that the video’s dialogue 
is in plain English and not filled with medical jargon— without consuming 
more of the physician’s valuable time. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A major flaw in the current legal doctrine of informed consent is that it 
assumes that patients can read and understand the information on informed 
consent forms, and thus does not adequately consider patient health 
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literacy.235  Inadequate health literacy is a pervasive problem in the United 
States, affects a wide variety of people, and is not easily recognized by 
physicians.236  The legal doctrine of informed consent emphasizes the 
importance of disclosure, while ethics supports the importance of 
understanding and communication in the consent process, an aspect that is 
currently overlooked in the legal system.  The legal presumption that 
informed consent was obtained if a patient signed an informed consent form 
does not encourage genuine informed consent.  Informed consent forms are 
often written far above the reading level of an average patient.237  Policies 
and practices should be more closely aligned with the ethical requirements 
of informed consent: understanding and communication.238 
Consideration of health literacy in informed consent is important 
because a patient’s literacy level can greatly impact their ability to 
understand the contents of a consent form and/or discussion with a 
healthcare provider.  Without comprehending the consent information, a 
patient is denied their right to make informed, autonomous decisions about 
their healthcare.  The law has done little to encourage the ethical 
justifications and legal rhetoric behind informed consent: patient self-
determination and autonomy.239  “The physician who punctiliously recites 
the litany of potential risks and secures the patient’s signature on the proper 
form, but who fails even to attempt to engage the patient as a person in the 
decisionmaking process at more than this superficial level, may well be 
legally protected.”240  A consent form that says that the patient’s signature 
means that they have read and understood the form is irrelevant if they 
cannot even read that line. 
As pointed out by Paasche-Orlow, the complexity of pre-printed 
informed consent forms is evidence that the focus of the form “is not patient 
education but an attempt to avoid professional liability.”241  When seeking 
the informed consent of patients with low health literacy, complex and 
technical consent forms should increase, not decrease, professional liability, 
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if additional measures are not taken by the provider to ensure that the 
patient understands and consents—more than just receiving a signed form. 
Opening the floodgates for more informed consent litigation against 
physicians is not the goal of this Comment.  This Comment simply seeks to 
highlight that genuine informed consent cannot be achieved by reliance on 
consent forms that patients with limited health literacy cannot understand.  If 
a form is not too lengthy, has a good layout, a readable text size, and uses 
plain language, then the signature of a patient with low health literacy, but 
not those who are completely illiterate, would be stronger evidence of 
informed consent.  Utilization of accommodations for literacy, that is, 
simpler language in consent forms and enhanced communications 
processes, such as the teach-back or repeat-back methods, should free 
physicians of liability for obtaining informed consent.  Such methods should 
be encouraged by state law so that the physician’s own motivation to be free 
from liability is aligned with the goal of informed consent: enabling patients 
to understand and make autonomous decisions about their healthcare. 
Another approach to ensure that health literacy is adequately considered 
in informed consent is to advocate for state legislatures to adopt the 
reasonable patient standard of disclosure.  For states that have adopted the 
reasonable patient standard, advocacy should revolve around defining a 
reasonable patient as one who has low health literacy, or using a more 
subjective standard.  An additional avenue for advocacy would be to 
propose or support state legislation that declares that a mere signature on a 
consent form is not enough to satisfy genuine informed consent. 
Currently, the legal duty of informed consent is significantly different 
than the ethical theories of informed consent.  Instead of encouraging 
discussion, understanding, and patient autonomy, the doctrine of informed 
consent emphasizes the formality of obtaining a patient’s signature.  If 
informed consent is to represent a patient’s knowing and understanding of 
risks, then health literacy must be considered as well.  An appropriate 
consideration of health literacy can be achieved by either extending current 
theories through advocacy around the definitions of “reasonable physician” 
and “reasonable patient,” or through legislation. 
If informed consent forms are intended to serve as educational 
documents to facilitate the decision making process, then they should be 
treated as such.242  Physicians should no longer be permitted to avoid 
liability by procuring a signature on a consent form without having disclosed 
the risks and alternatives to patients with different health literacy levels in a 
manner that enables patients to understand to what they are consenting.  At 
the very least, courts should consider the readability level of consent forms 
 
 242. Id. at 131-32. 
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before courts presume that they are representative of a patient’s informed 
consent.  As patients take on more personal responsibility for their 
healthcare with the rise in popularity of CDHC, it is becoming increasingly 
important that the law recognize physicians’ duties to obtain genuine 
informed consent. 
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